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INTRODUCTION 
With Martha Stewart, Mark Cuban, and Phil Mickelson, insider 
trading investigations have become a high profile form of corporate 
crime.1 With stories full of interesting characters, it is not hard to see 
why this problem has caught the public’s eye. Examples of these stories 
range from the sympathetic, like Rajat Gupta, the sixty-three-year-old 
retiree who started with nothing,2 to the shameless, like Gupta’s tippee, 
Raj Rajaratnam, the billionaire investor whose entire business was 
based on receiving tips from those close to his company and teaching 
them to conceal those tips.3 Prosecutions and public attention focused 
on insider trading have seen an unprecedented rise in the last few 
decades.4 Scholars have attributed the proliferation of these cases as a 
“symptom of cancerous greed on Wall Street.”5 However, Congress has 
failed to enact a statute outlawing any form of insider trading outright.6 
Rather, prosecutors are forced to rely on the general fraud statutes, 
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 1.  Stephen Clark, Insider Trading and Financial Economics: Where Do We Go From 
Here?, 16 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 43, 45 (2010) (discussing how insider trading has captured the 
attention of the academy and the public).  
 2.  Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Rajat Gupta Convicted of Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 16, 2012), http://www.dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/rajat-gupta-convicted-of-insider-
trading/. 
 3.  Anna Driggers, Raj Rajaratnam’s Historic Insider Trading Sentence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 2021, 2028 (2012). 
 4.  Charles C. Cox & Keven S. Fogerty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 
353, 353 (1988). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading 
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 179–80 (1991) (explaining the ambiguity in insider trading 
regulations and how to combat them). 
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such as Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule 10b-5.7 As a result, 
there continues to be some ambiguity as to what constitutes insider 
trading and how to combat the use of material, nonpublic information 
to deceive counterparties in these deals. 
Following contentious litigation and investigations by the SEC, the 
Supreme Court held in Dirks v. SEC8 that a fiduciary duty is breached 
when the insider privy to the information receives a “personal 
benefit.”9 However, confusion still surrounds this pronouncement, and 
courts remain divided on what is required to constitute a personal 
benefit. The Court granted certiorari in United States v. Salman to 
clarify whether the personal benefit must be a pecuniary gain, as the 
Second Circuit determined in United States v. Newman,10 or if the 
insider can personally benefit in other ways in order to uphold insider 
trading convictions.11 
This commentary argues that the Court should interpret the 
personal benefit standard in Dirks to constitute two possibilities: (1) a 
quid pro quo relationship; and (2) when the relationship between the 
tipper and tippee is so clear that the tipper inherently does receive a 
benefit by providing material nonpublic information to the tippee. It 
proceeds in the following parts. Part I summarizes the factual and 
procedural background in Salman. Part II explains the legal 
background of insider trading. Part III presents the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding and rationale in Salman. Part IV explores the parties’ 
arguments. Part V analyzes how the Supreme Court should rule on 
Salman based on the holdings in Dirks, Newman, and the decisions 
below. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2002, Maher Kara began working for Citigroup in its healthcare 
investment banking group.12 Throughout the next few years, Maher 
sought help from his brother Michael Kara to better understand the 
 
 7.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008). 
 8.  463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 9.  Id. at 664. 
 10.  United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 11.  See Salman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 899, 899 (2016) (granting certiorari to question 
one in the Petition). 
 12.  Brief for the United States in Opposition at 2, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628 
(2015) [hereinafter Brief for the United States in Opposition]. 
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science behind his work.13 By 2004, Maher was sharing confidential 
information about Citigroup’s practices.14 From 2004 to 2007, Maher 
knowingly disclosed information about upcoming mergers and 
acquisitions by Citigroup clients.15 Maher suspected that Michael was 
trading on the information, but Michael denied it.16 
Maher and Michael were extremely close.17 Michael helped pay 
Maher’s college tuition and took on the role of their deceased father at 
Maher’s wedding.18 Maher testified that he gave Michael the 
information to benefit Michael by “getting him off my back, and 
fulfilling whatever needs he had.”19 
In 2003, Maher became engaged to Petitioner Bassam Yacoub 
Salman’s sister.20 The families became extremely close.21 In the fall of 
2004, Michael began to share the trading tips he was receiving from 
Maher with Salman.22 Salman decided not to set up his own brokerage 
account, and instead arranged transfers into an account held jointly 
under the name of his wife’s sister and her husband, Karim Bayyouk.23 
Salman shared the information he learned with Bayyouk, and the two 
split the profits.24 The account ultimately grew from $396,000 to 
approximately $2.1 million; Salman and Bayyouk earned 
approximately $1.7 million.25 
According to Michael’s testimony, Salman knew that Maher was 
the source of the trading information.26 Michael testified that he 
“directly” told Salman, and that the two agreed “they had to ‘protect’ 
Maher and promised to shred all of the papers.”27 Furthermore, there 
was evidence that Salman knew how close the relationship was 
between the two brothers.28 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628 (2015) 
[hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari]. 
 20.  Id. at 3. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 1090. 
BECKER WORD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/1/2016  1:00 PM 
50 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12 
 
On September 1, 2011, Salman was indicted for one count of 
conspiracy to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 
four counts of securities fraud in violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act and Rule 10b-5.29 The jury found Salman guilty on all five counts.30 
Salman was sentenced to thirty-six months in prison followed by three 
years of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution of 
$738,539.42.31 
Salman moved for a new trial,32 and his post-conviction motions 
were denied.33 The Ninth Circuit affirmed Salman’s convictions, 
holding that “there can be no question that, under Dirks, the evidence 
was sufficient for the jury to find that Maher disclosed the information 
in breach of his fiduciary duties and that [Salman] knew as much.”34 On 
November 10, 2015, Salman filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court.35 The petition sought review on two issues: (1) Under 
Dirks, does the personal benefit to the insider need to be pecuniary or 
is a familial relationship enough; and (2) Can failure to investigate 
where the tip came from constitute willful blindness?36 On January 19, 
2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the first issue.37 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
Securities fraud derives from statute. The Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were enacted in direct response to 
the 1929 crash and subsequent depression.38 Fears of excessive 
speculation and another market crash fueled the public’s desire for 
reform.39 
 
 
 29.  Id. at 1088. 
 30.  Id. at 1090. 
 31.  Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 12, at 2. 
 32.  United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 33.  United States v. Salman, No. CR–11–0625, 2013 WL 6655176, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 
2013). 
 34.  Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092. 
 35.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19. 
 36.  Id. at i. 
 37.  See Salman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 899, 899 (2016). 
 38.  Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 385, 408 (1990). 
 39.  Id. at 409. 
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Courts have read a prohibition against insider trading into § 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act,40 which provides a “catch-all” method to combat 
securities fraud.41 The SEC then promulgated Rule 10b-5, which states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.42 
Neither the statute nor the rule specifically prohibit insider 
trading.43 However, the illegality of insider training is predicated on the 
idea that it is securities fraud under Rule 10b-5.44 Like securities fraud, 
insider trading is also a breach of a fiduciary duty.45 Under Rule 10b-5, 
the person who bears this duty misleads either the opposing party of 
the transaction or the shareholders by trading on the information.46 The 
Supreme Court has determined that Rule 10b-5 must be understood to 
prevent insider trading based on the idea that traders who have access 
to information for corporate purposes (nonpublic information) may 
not take advantage of the information, which is unavailable to the other 
side.”47 Therefore, the informed person has an obligation to disclose the 
information or not trade.48 
 
 
 40.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008). 
 41.  Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(B) and Rule 10B-5: The Continued Validity 
of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchase-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 843 
(2009). 
 42.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
 43.  United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading: United States v. Newman and the 
Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 6 (2015).  
 46.  Willis W. Hagen II, Insider Trading Under Rule 10b-5: The Theoretical Bases for 
Liability, 44 THE BUS. LAW. 13, 15 (1988). 
 47.  SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 48.  Hagen, supra note 46, at 15. 
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The scope of insider trading hinges on definitions contained in the 
statute and the regulation. An “insider” is defined as a director, officer, 
or principal stockholder under Section 16 of the Exchange Act.49 Rule 
10b-5 is applicable not only to “insiders,” but also to anyone with 
material, nonpublic information.50 
Congress and the SEC do not provide a definition of “material, 
nonpublic information.”51 However, courts have typically held that 
unlawful insider trades occur when trades are made immediately prior 
to the disclosure of corporate takeovers, earnings announcements, or 
dividend announcements.52 The SEC defines “nonpublic information” 
as information that investors “may not lawfully acquire without the 
consent of the source,” or information that has not been made available 
to investors generally.53 The Second Circuit defines material 
information as “those facts which affect the probable future of the 
company[,] and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy, 
sell, or hold the company’s securities.”54 
Proponents of criminalizing insider trading argue that it is unfair to 
consumers and “undermines public confidence in capital markets.”55 
According to the Supreme Court, an animating purpose behind the 
enactment of the Exchange Act was “to insure honest securities 
markets and thereby promote investor confidence.”56 Advocates also 
claim that this conduct allows traders to profit from corporate 
misfortune, or that it allows insiders to divert profits from shareholders 
to themselves.57 
B.  Common Law Insider Trading and the “Personal Benefit” 
Requirement 
The first time that insider trading was considered a form of 
securities fraud was in the SEC investigation’s In re Cady, Roberts & 
 
 49.  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2011). 
 50.  Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848. 
 51.  Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Defining “Material, Nonpublic”: What Should 
Constitute Illegal Insider Trading Information?, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 327, 342 (2016). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 322 n.2 (1979).  
 54.  Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849. 
 55.  Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 857, 858 (1983). 
 56.  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997).  
 57.  Carlton & Fischel, supra note 55, at 858. 
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Co.58 The SEC ruled that insider trading was defined by two elements: 
(1) “the existence of a relationship giving access directly or indirectly, 
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose 
and not for the personal benefit of anyone[,]” and (2) “the inherent 
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information 
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”59 Seven 
years later, the Second Circuit ruled in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.60 
that the SEC’s understanding of insider trading in Cady, Roberts was 
correct.61 The court then explained that the congressional purpose 
behind Rule 10b-5 was that investors should have equal access to 
information, rewards, and risks of securities markets.62 
In 1983, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dirks v. SEC.63 
Raymond Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer firm when 
he received information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity 
Funding of America, who alleged that the company’s assets were 
overvalued due to fraudulent practices.64 Dirks investigated the 
allegations, and while senior management denied the misconduct, 
employees of the corporation corroborated the story.65 Dirks urged 
William Blundell at the Wall Street Journal’s Los Angeles office to 
write a story on the fraud, but Blundell did not believe such a massive 
fraud could be occurring and turned down the story.66 While Dirks 
continued to investigate, he told people about Secrist’s allegations.67 
Those people then traded based on the information, and  Equity 
Funding stock prices fell dramatically.68 The SEC convicted Dirks for 
aiding and abetting the fraud.69 The Supreme Court overturned his 
conviction and ruled that Dirks had no duty to abstain from use of the 
inside information that he obtained.70 
Under the “classical theory” of insider trading, anyone in 
possession of material, nonpublic information about a corporation 
 
 58.  40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 59.  Id. at 912. 
 60.  401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 61.  Id. at 852. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 64.  Id. at 648–49.  
 65.  Id. at 649. 
 66.  Id. at 649–50. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 650. 
 70.  Id. at 665. 
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cannot trade on this information, or the information needs to be 
disclosed to the party on the other side of the trade.71 This can be true 
if the person who has the information (the “insider”) trades, or if the 
insider becomes a “tipper” and gives the information to another (the 
“tippee”) who trades.72 It is also possible to have “tipping chains.”73 
In Dirks, the Court established the modern requirements for 
tipper/tippee liability under this classical framework.74 The Court held 
that (1) the insider must breach her fiduciary duty to shareholders; and 
(2) the tippee must know, or should know, that the breach occurred.75 
The Supreme Court concluded that a tippee does not inherit a duty to 
“disclose or abstain” automatically.76 The Court held that two elements 
establish a violation of Rule 10b-5: “(i) the existence of a relationship 
affording access to inside information intended to be available only for 
a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without 
disclosure.”77 
However, the Court also held that not every breach of fiduciary 
duty falls under Rule 10b-5.78 The Court recognizes, as does the SEC, 
the vital role that market analysts play in the “preservation of a healthy 
market,” and that this role would be inhibited if prosecutions could 
occur when there is any disparity of information.79 Accordingly, the 
Court determined that tippees assume an insider’s duty to the 
shareholders when the information is obtained improperly.80 The Court 
determined that the intent behind Rule 10b-5 was to eliminate the 
 
 71.  David T. Cohen, Old Rule, New Theory: Revising the Personal Benefit Requirement for 
Tipper/Tippee Liability Under the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 47 B.C. L. REV. 
547, 552–53 (2006).  
 72.  See id. at 554 (stating that liability under the classical theory occurs when a person is an 
insider or the tippee of an insider). 
 73.  This occurs when A (the tipper) gives information to B (tippee 1) and B gives that 
information to C (tippee 2), C can be liable, as long as C had reason to know that A (the source 
of the information) breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing it the first time. See Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of Insider Trading: A Comprehensive Primer 20 (Mar. 13, 
2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=261277. See, e.g., 
United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 
438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 74.  Cohen, supra note 71, at 558.   
 75.  Id. at 558–59. 
 76.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
 77.  Id. at 653–54 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980)).  
 78.  Id. at 654 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)). 
 79.  See id. at 658.  
 80.  See id. at 660. 
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ability of individuals to obtain a “personal advantage” through the use 
of inside information.81 Therefore, the test for inside-trading liability is 
“whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from 
his disclosure.”82 When the individual privy to the inside information 
obtains no personal benefit, the duty to shareholders has not been 
breached.83 This is the issue that the Court must further define in 
Salman. 
C.  The Circuit Split 
Circuits are currently divided on when a personal benefit to the 
insider may be inferred from a personal relationship between the tipper 
and tippee. The Second and Ninth Circuits diverge as discussed below.  
The Second Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks 
to United States v. Newman.84 Newman and Chiasson, two portfolio 
managers, were convicted of securities fraud.85 The Second Circuit 
vacated the convictions and remanded the case to dismiss the 
indictments.86 
The parties did not dispute that Chiasson and Newman knew 
almost nothing about the insiders nor any personal benefit the insiders 
may have received.87 The Second Circuit found that if there was a 
benefit in this case, then “practically anything would qualify.”88 One 
tipper received career advice from a tippee.89 The other tipper only 
knew a tippee from church, and they occasionally socialized together.90 
Therefore, the Government’s evidence was insufficient to prove a 
personal benefit in order to establish tipper liability, so Chiasson and 
Newman could not be liable as tippees.91  
 
 
 81.  Id. at 662 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 85.  Id. at 442. 
 86.  Id. at 455. 
 87.  Id. at 453. 
 88.  Id. at 452. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 451. However, in a prior case, the Second Circuit broadly defined “personal 
benefit” and held that “it includes not only ‘pecuniary gain,’ such as a cut of the take or a gratuity 
from the tippee, but also a ‘reputational benefit’ or the benefit one would obtain from simply 
‘mak[ing] a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.’” SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 
276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983)). 
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Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, in this case, held that the personal 
benefit element of the breach of fiduciary duty was satisfied when the 
“insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative 
or friend.’”92 The Ninth Circuit held that reading Newman as requiring 
the tipper to receive a tangible benefit, and that the tippee knows about 
it, contradicted Dirks.93 It also pointed out that Newman recognized 
personal benefit as including the benefit of gifting confidential 
information to a friend.94 
III.  HOLDING 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed Salman’s conviction.95 The court held 
that the evidence was “more than sufficient for a rational jury to find 
both that the inside information was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary 
duty, and that Salman knew of that breach at the time he traded on it.”96 
The court interpreted “personal benefit” to include an insider 
gifting confidential information to a trading relative or friend.97 The 
Government provided evidence that Maher breached his fiduciary 
duty when he disclosed nonpublic information in exchange for 
education and to further their relationship. 98 It is unclear if Salman 
knew the entire history or extent of Maher and Michael’s relationship, 
but it is uncontroverted that Salman knew the brothers were close.99 
Therefore, Salman knew that Maher gave the information to Michael 
intending to benefit his relative.100 The court held that this relationship 
was sufficient grounds to establish a personal benefit; that Maher 
breached his fiduciary duty for this relationship; and that Salman’s 
knowledge of this relationship and the breach was sufficient to affirm 
his conviction.101 
 
 92.  United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 
664). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 1093–94 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452). 
 95.  Id. at 1094. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 1092. 
 98.  Id. at 1094. 
 99.  Id. at 1094. 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. 
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IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Salman’s Arguments 
Salman argues that the Court’s test under Dirks has not been met 
because the Government did not prove that the disclosure by the 
insider (Maher) was motivated by pecuniary gain.102 Therefore, no 
fiduciary duty was breached.103 Furthermore, Salman argues a broader 
construction of insider trading liability, where no pecuniary gain occurs, 
violates the Constitution.104 
Salman’s argument is three-pronged. First, the Government’s 
theory of tippee liability contradicts the Court’s precedent and is not 
supported by the language or legislative history of Section 10(b).105 
Second, since Section 10(b) does not explicitly prohibit insider trading, 
the rule of lenity requires the common law doctrine be narrowly 
construed.106 Third, Salman’s conviction does not meet the Court’s 
pecuniary gain standard.107 
First, Salman argues that the Government is attempting to rewrite 
the definition of insider trading by vastly expanding tippee liability, in 
complete disregard for the Court’s precedent and the language and 
history of Section 10(b).108 He claims that the Government is 
attempting to replace the “personal benefit” test that the Supreme 
Court provided in Dirks with a “‘lack of corporate purpose’ test: 
knowingly trading on material nonpublic information would be 
criminal whenever an insider disclosed the information ‘for personal, 
rather than corporate, reasons.’”109 
Salman also argues that the Government’s arguments are 
inconsistent with the text and history of Section 10(b). Section 10(b) 
contains no language specifically outlawing insider trading, unlike 
other countries that have outlawed the practice.110 Salman points out 
that both the statute and legislative history are ambiguous, so courts 
created liability based on judicial interpretations and SEC 
 
 102.  See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 24, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628 (2016) 
[hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner]. 
 103.  See id. at 4. 
 104.  Id. at 26. 
 105.  See id. at 24. 
 106.  See id. 
 107.  See id. 
 108.  Id. at 2. 
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id. at 8. 
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administrative decisions.111 Similarly,  the drafters of the Exchange Act 
were aware of inside trading, but did not address the subject or intend 
for Section 10(b) to determine its illegality.112 
Next, Salman argues that the Government switched its theory upon 
appeal when it realized its original theory was too vague.113 Originally, 
the Government argued that gifting a tip to a friend or relative was a 
benefit to the tipper.114  According to Salman, this theory violates due 
process because it fails to state what relationships are sufficiently close 
to automatically give off a personal benefit and it does not identify 
what a disclosure must consist of to constitute a gift.115 Now, Salman 
claims the Government presents a new theory to the Court: that the tip 
will be a breach of fiduciary duty if it does not coincide with a corporate 
purpose.116 Salman argues that under this new test, there would be no 
need to ask what benefits are sufficient, or to examine the relationship 
between the tipper and tippee, because any relationship would lead to 
liability.117 
Second, Salman argues that since Section 10(b) does not expressly 
prohibit insider trading, courts must construe the statute narrowly.118 
The Constitution vests the power to define crimes solely with the 
legislature.119 Since Congress has not made policy decisions to explicitly 
codify insider trading, the common-law doctrine is ambiguous.120 
Therefore, until Congress enacts legislation on the matter, the crime 
should be narrowly construed in courts’ application.121 The 
Government, specifically the SEC, has hesitated to create any bright 
line rule so that investors are not given reign to trade legally using 
nonpublic information.122 Salman argues that the Government has tried 
to prosecute corporate crime using “seemingly indeterminate language 
to usurp the power to define the crime” until the Court holds the 
 
 111.  See id. at 9 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980)). 
 112.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Mark Cuban in Support of Petitioner at 4, United States v. 
Salman, No. 15-628 (2016) (quoting Donald Cook & Myer Feldman, Insider Trading Under the 
Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 386 (1953)). 
 113.  Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 13. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id. at 14. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 15.  
 119.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 120.  Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 15. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 16–17. 
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Government in check.123 According to Salman, until Congress “enacts 
a statute identifying [the] elements [of insider trading], courts lack the 
appropriate tools to implement the will of Congress.”124 The pecuniary 
gain standard provides an unambiguous test.125  Salman defines 
pecuniary gain as “broker commissions or other compensation, not 
some intangible benefit.”126 
Third, Salman argues that the Government’s argument cannot 
stand under the pecuniary gain standard because Maher had no 
financial incentive to release the information.127 Even if the Court were 
to accept a “lack of corporate purpose” theory, Salman argues his 
conviction should be overturned because the jury was never instructed 
on this rule.128 
B.  The Government’s Arguments 
The Government argues that there is “overwhelming” evidence of 
Section 10(b) liability, including personal benefit to the tipper, and  the 
petitioner’s knowledge of this benefit.129 The Government’s argument 
rests on three ideas. First, the personal benefit standard in Dirks creates 
liability when a tipper acts for her own benefit instead of the 
corporation.130 Second, stare decisis requires the court to uphold, rather 
than reconsider the standard in Dirks.131 Finally, the Government did 
not create a new federal crime with insider trading, rather it defined a 
crime that was already prohibited by Section 10(b).132 The heart of the 
Government’s argument is that “[t]he tipper’s purpose, rather than the 
identity of the recipient, is dispositive.”133 
The Government argues that “[t]he existence of [a] ‘personal 
benefit’ is simply the flip side of the absence of a corporate purpose.”134 
The personal benefit test is fulfilled when the tipper discloses 
 
 123.  Id. at 18. 
 124.  Id. at 22.  
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 5 (parentheses omitted). 
 127.  Id. at 24. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Brief for the United States at 54–55, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628 (2016) 
[hereinafter Brief for the United States]. 
 130.  See id. 
 131.  See id. 
 132.  See id. 
 133.  Id. at 42. 
 134.  Id. at 19. 
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information for personal rather than corporate reasons.135 The 
Government reasons that whenever an insider discloses nonpublic 
information, he breaches his fiduciary duty by “inherently act[ing] 
contrary to a corporate purpose, to the detriment of shareholders.”136 
In this case, the Government analogizes insider trading to 
embezzlement, arguing that the criminal act is “the embezzler’s use of 
the property—here, confidential information—not for the purposes for 
which it was entrusted, but for the person’s own purposes.”137 The 
Government further pointed to the Court’s use of “trading relative or 
friend” in Dirks to exemplify personal, as opposed to corporate 
purposes.138 
Next, the Government argues that stare decisis and Congress’s 
endorsement mean that the Court should uphold Dirks’ standard.139 
Salman’s argument lacks merit because the Court itself states “that 
personal benefit includes things ‘such as pecuniary gain’. . . [and] then 
goes on to list a number of other forms of benefit that qualify.”140 
Furthermore, a pecuniary gain standard would create new ambiguities 
regarding the timing of the gain, the amount of money that triggers 
these protections, and whether the money needs to be received or can 
be expected.141  Salman has not addressed any of these questions.142 The 
Government also argues that the Second Circuit was “erroneous” in 
Newman, and that this represents the sole example of a misapplication 
of Dirks.143 Therefore, the standard is not ambiguous. 
Finally, the Government claims that insider trading’s illegality 
comes directly from Section 10(b)’s language.144 Section 10(b) is 
intentionally broad, in order to capture various and new forms of 
securities fraud.145 The Court has created a limiting principle by 
recognizing that the insider must violate a duty for the conduct to be 
 
 135.  Id. at 18. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 23. 
 138.  Id. at 27. 
 139.  Id. at 29. 
 140.  Id. at 34 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983)). 
 141.  Id. at 34–35. 
 142.  Id. at 37–38, 38 n.6. 
 143.  Id. at 39. 
 144.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008) (It is unlawful “to use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange . . . any manipulative 
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe. . . .”). 
 145.  Brief for the United States, supra note 129, at 46. 
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fraudulent.146 The Government argues that accepting the pecuniary 
gain rule would absolve liability from any insider that gifts information 
to his relatives or friends so long as she can show she did not receive a 
pecuniary return.147 
The Government also makes a policy argument that eliminating the 
use of material, non-public information is “vital to investor 
confidence.”148 If disparity of information becomes a “rigged game,” 
people will refuse to invest because they will not trust the market.149 
Therefore, allowing a pecuniary benefit standard undermines Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.150 Such a test defeats the purpose of insider 
trading laws, and individuals will stop investing if they perceive markets 
are no longer fair.151 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court should hold for the Government. The Court should rule 
as follows: the information disclosed by Maher was a breach of 
fiduciary duty, for which he received a personal benefit; Salman knew 
that Maher breached his duty and that the information was nonpublic 
when he traded on it. Ruling for the Government in this case would 
respect Dirks. Furthermore, the Court can clarify what the “personal 
benefit” theory entails and protect the policies behind insider trading 
criminality. However, there does need to be a clear limiting principle 
on downstream liability. Finally, Salman can be read not to conflict with 
Newman, if the Court finds that Newman can be distinguished from this 
case for lack of a quid pro quo. 
A.  The Plain Meaning of Dirks Requires the Court to Affirm Salman’s 
Conviction 
Based on Dirks, the Court should define personal benefit in two 
ways. First, a personal benefits occurs when there is a quid pro quo, 
which may be monetary or any advantage or profit the insider receives. 
Second, when the insider and the tippee are so intimately connected by 
their relationship, the information provided is per se a personal benefit. 
 
 146.  See id. at 47 (explaining how Dirks rejected a rule that would make it illegal to use 
confidential information in securities trading just because the counterparty did not have access to 
that information). 
 147.  Id. at 48. 
 148.  Id. at 49. 
 149.  Id. at 49–50. 
 150.  See id. at 52.  
 151.  See id. at 49. 
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The Court ruled in Dirks that insider trading occurs when the 
disclosure is fraudulent, meaning it deceives or defrauds 
shareholders.152 The court must look at “objective criteria, i.e., whether 
the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the 
disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain[,] or a reputational benefit that will 
translate into future earnings.”153 In Dirks, the Court discusses two 
scenarios that could lead a reasonable juror to infer a personal benefit 
was gained, like (1) a relationship suggesting quid pro quo, or (2) when 
the information is given as a gift to a “trading relative or friend.”154 This 
leads directly to the two forms of personal benefit the Court should 
adopt. 
These elements are clearly present in this case. It is not contested 
that Maher and Michael were close. As the Ninth Circuit observed, 
even if Salman did not know all of the details of the Kara brothers’ 
relationship, as a close friend and family member, a reasonable juror 
could infer that he knew Maher’s tips to Michael were predicated on 
Maher’s intention to receive a benefit.155 Salman then received the 
information from Michael. Based on Michael’s testimony, the 
Government proved that Salman both knew where the information 
came from, and that it was nonpublic. Therefore, following the plain 
language of Dirks, Salman’s conviction should be upheld. 
Salman contends that the judgment cannot stand on the 
Government’s non-purpose theory because it did not go to the jury.156 
The Court, however, does not need to define a new standard. The Court 
may uphold the conviction based on Dirks, which did go to the jury in 
this case. If the Court does choose to adopt a “non-corporate purpose” 
definition of “personal benefit,” however, the conviction can still stand. 
Arguably, the Government did not provide an alternative, novel 
standard.157 Rather, it clarified “personal benefit,” a term already used, 
to prevent the ambiguity that has caused confusion in this case.158 
Finally, the Court could also uphold Salman’s conviction under 
Dirks by alternatively defining “personal benefit.” An example of this 
 
 152.  Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. at 664. 
 155.  United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 156.  Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 24. 
 157.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 129, at 40 (explaining that the Dirks standard 
is unambiguous and does not require a new theory). 
 158.  See id. at 19 (defining personal benefit as corporate purpose). 
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would be a “gift theory,” in which the tipper does not benefit in a 
tangible way, but he is incentivized to disclose information in order to 
bestow a gift to the tippee.159 Accordingly, the tippee would only need 
to know that the tipper’s motivation was some personal benefit, which 
under this theory would be the satisfaction of giving a gift.160 This 
theory also does not change the Dirks standard; it clarifies it. Therefore, 
the jury was properly instructed. The Government can maintain 
Salman’s conviction because he knew that Maher gifted the 
information to Michael and that Maher breached his duty, but Salman 
still traded on it. 
B.  The Policies Behind Insider Trading Liability Support the 
Government’s Position 
Allowing Salman to trade on material nonpublic information he 
obtained in this way contradicts the policies undergirding into Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Salman’s knowledge is unfair to consumers 
because he knows that the information came from Maher, an insider. If 
the Court were to follow Salman’s argument, it would provide a 
mechanism through which an insider can escape prosecution by 
providing money to her family members as long as the insider does not 
receive any money back, even if she receives an intangible benefit.161 
However, the benefit to the insider alone is not what makes insider 
trading unfair, or else anyone who does well playing the stock market 
has a problem. Rather, insider trading is unfair because a fiduciary duty 
was breached by disclosure.162 Therefore, if personal benefit means 
receiving any valuable benefit back, or having a relationship where 
helping the tippee automatically helps the insider, the underlying 
purpose of the law is protected. 
Salman’s argument that a pecuniary benefit standard is enough to 
cover inside traders misses a huge group of individuals that Dirks 
covered. For example, those who trade information in exchange for 
their child’s admission to a prestigious college would be free from 
liability. Under the Government’s “lack of corporate purpose test,” 
these people are now liable. However, the Government’s theory 
ignores reasons why information should be disclosed, even if it goes 
 
 159.   Katherine Drummonds, Resuscitating Dirks: How the Salman Gift Theory of Tipper-
Tippee Personal Benefit Would Improve Insider Trading Law, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV., 833, 849 
(2016). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Brief for the United States, supra note 129, at 48. 
 162.  Cohen, supra note 71, at 550. 
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against the wishes of the corporation, like whistleblowing. Someone 
who seeks to report a company’s wrongdoings to help authorities is 
acting against the company in sharing material non-public 
information.163 But prosecuting him for this disclosure is counter-
intuitive because he provides a social good.164 To avoid these types of 
issues, the Court should use the two standards in Dirks but with 
clarified definitions of (1) a quid pro quo situation or (2) specific close 
relationships, such as family and close friends. This provides a way to 
curb liability, while protecting the reasons insider trading is illegal in 
the first instance. 
C.  Newman can be Distinguished from the Case at Bar 
The Court can uphold Salman’s conviction without overturning 
Newman. Salman and Newman differ on their facts, specifically the 
relationship between tippee and tipper.165 In Newman, the Second 
Circuit ruled that the career advice that the tipper had received and the 
fact that the tipper and tippee attended the same church, were too 
attenuated to constitute the relationship Dirks required.166 
Instead of reading Newman as a departure from Dirks, it can be 
looked at as a recognition of  Dirks’ limits and an “attempted 
clarification.”167 It can therefore be argued that Salman falls within the 
limits of “personal benefit,” while Newman stands outside. In fact, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]o the extent Newman can be read to go so 
far, we decline to follow it.”168 Therefore, a true circuit split was not 
created;169 the Ninth Circuit simply rejected Salman’s interpretation of 
Newman.170 In Newman, there was no quid pro quo nor was the 
relationship between the tipper and tippee, as church acquaintances, 
enough to meet the standard suggested here. Salman, however, meets 
the element based on the relationship in the case. 
 
 163.  See e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648–50 (1983). 
 164.  Id. at 665–67. 
 165.  John L. Potapchuk, The Sky is Not Falling, Todd Newman: The Ninth Circuit Endorses 
a Measured Reading of Newman’s Definition of Personal Benefit for Insider Trading Liability in 
United States v. Salman, 57 B.C. L. REV. 139, 154 (2016). 
 166.  United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 167.  Potapchuck, supra note 165, at 142.  
 168.  United States v. Salman, 792, F.3d 1087, 1093 (2015).  
 169.  Potapchuk, supra note 165, at 158. 
 170.  Id.  
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CONCLUSION 
The decision in Salman v. United States will be, at its core, a question 
of what constitutes a “personal benefit” to the insider. The Court 
should rule that a personal benefit can be (1) a quid pro quo situation 
or (2) defined close relationships such as family and close friends. Here, 
because the insider passed on the information to his brother, who then 
shared the information with his close friend and relative, the Court will 
likely rule for the Government. The Court’s ruling should clarify some 
of the ambiguity surrounding insider trading standards while upholding 
the policy goals so clearly at stake in securities fraud cases. 
While this would help clarify some of the ambiguity in determining 
insider trading liability, it will not solve everything. Even in this case, 
the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to Salman’s second 
question: whether willful blindness is applicable in insider trading171 If 
willful blindness is accepted as a theory of liability, it may have negative 
implications on securities fraud.172 However, barring the use of willful 
blindness also provides a loophole where the government cannot 
prosecute a trader who avoids learning the source of a tip. These 
questions will need to be decided in the future as insider trading 
litigation continues to proliferate. 
171.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19, at 9.
172.  See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
